Political Dimensions of Wittgenstein’s “Praxis” as a Linguistic Activity

Article paru dans le volume « Political Dimensions of Wittgenstein’s conception of praxis as a linguistic activity ? »,  texte d’une conférence prononcée à Lecce dans les Pouilles (Italie)  dans un colloque sur Wittgenstein and Marx, Marx and Wittgenstein,  Actes publiés chez Peter Lang, Treffpunkt Philosophie, Bd 21  (von Mathias Kaufmann herausg..)  Berlin 2021, pp 167-180.
co-eds. Fabio A. Sulpizio/Moira da Iaco /Gabriele Schimmenti

Lien https://www.peterlang.com/document/1137112

* Abstract: My contention here is to argue  that Wittgenstein’s semantic point on reification could meet the marxist anaysis of the tendency to reification at a socio-political level. According to my view, a diagnosis of « semantic alienation » of a Wittgensteinian-minded  philosopher could rather re-inforce an Adornian diagnosis of political reification, rather than contradict it. Although the absence of  language in Adorno’s conception  on one side, and the absence of a concept of « mediation » in Wittgenstein, make the confrontation difficult, I argue in favor of  a social-critical view of Wittgenstein’s approach to praxis as a linguistic activity. Not only Wittgenstein has his own view on fetichization  (of “objects”)  as regards the relation of designation of objects by names and developed an interesting  critique of the “epistemological ritual”  of naming objects that has a strong political dimension (Aldo Gargani’s point), there is much to say as regards the benefit of a Marxist reading in parallel to a linguistic approach to objects.The role of  the economist Sraffa’s conception (close to Gramsci) and his influence on Wittgenstein’s radical turn to his so-called “second philosophy” are to be mentioned as they contribute to shed light on the social-political importance of the concept of “praxis” in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Yet I don’t assume that language and politics do match. The point is rather to establish criterions of efficiency different in kind rather than intrinsically opposed. 

Que penser de la controverse entre guérir du platonisme (Wittgenstein) et guérir de l’anti platonisme (Badiou) ?

Colloque sur la réception de Wittgenstein en France, qui s’est tenu à l’université de Nanterre en 2016, organisé par Elise Marrou, Pascale Gillot, et Judith Revel.

La conférence a été prononcée après la parution de mon livre : « Wittgenstein un anti philosophe ? » Publ. Chez Lambert Lucas, Limoges, 2016

D’une ontologie sans « participation », Wittgenstein un esprit d’ingénieur en philosophie : à l’idée d’une philosophie comme praxis applicative

J’interviendrai prochainement dans le congrès de l’ASPLF sur l’ontologie :

« D’une ontologie sans « participation », Wittgenstein un esprit d’ingénieur en philosophie : à l’idée d’une philosophie comme praxis applicative »,
org. Société française de philosophie, 27 avril-26 juin 2021. Paris

Faire nôtres les gestes de l’œuvre, au delà du parallélisme analytique entre musique et langage

Publication d’un article en français, « Faire nôtres les gestes de l’oeuvre, au delà du parallélisme analytique entre musique et langage »
RIFL,  volume 14, number 1, 2020,  numéro consacré à  « Music and Language Revisited » (eds. C. Stover, S. Oliva)

> Visit RIFL’s website: www.rifl.unical.it.
> RIFL archive: http://www.rifl.unical.it/index.php/rifl/issue/view/37

Why Wittgenstein’s use of the word « praxis » is not articulated to a social conception of the role of critique of language in society

Conférence le 11  décembre à l’Università del Salento à Lecce (Italie).

> Le programme

Abstract : “When words are not just, then the works of art are excluded, and then if works are ruled out, then morals and art are ill. Which means that “justice is not rightly applied and the nation does not know where to stand up safe” (K. Kraus).
Not only Wittgenstein has his own view on fetichization  (of “objects”)  as regards the relation of designation of objects (as ontologically  given) by names and developed an interesting  critique of the “epistemological ritual”  of naming « objects » that has a strong political dimension (Aldo Gargani’s point)  but there is much to say as regards the benefit of a Marxist reading in parallel to a linguistic approach to objects. The role of  the economist Sraffa’s conception (close to Gramsci) and his influence on Wittgenstein’s radical turn to his so-called “second philosophy” are to be mentioned in so far as they contribute to shed light on the social-political importance of the concept of “praxis” in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Yet far from me the idea that language and politics match. The point is rather to establish criterions of efficiency different in kind rather than intrinsically opposed.There are indeed good reasons for comparing the two critical diagnosis of semantic reification with social reification, given the existence of (austro) marxism in the social-political context of “Vienna the red” in the 1920’s as well as in the Marxist environment Wittgenstein was acquainted with in the 1935’s in Cambridge. Yet there is more to say in order to justify the use by Wittgenstein of the concept of “praxis”. Does “Praxis” as a key-word in Wittgenstein’s conception of “philosophy as an activity” in his second philosophy of “forms of life” contain a programme of application of symbols  in life that really witnesses the search for a socio-political efficacy beyond  a linguistic kind of praxis ? »