J’interviendrai prochainement dans le congrès de l’ASPLF sur l’ontologie :
« D’une ontologie sans « participation », Wittgenstein un esprit d’ingénieur en philosophie : à l’idée d’une philosophie comme praxis applicative »,
org. Société française de philosophie, 27 avril-26 juin 2021. Paris
Publication de l’article « Political Dimensions of Wittgenstein’s “Praxis” as a Linguistic Activity »
Dans Wittgenstein et Marx, Marx and Wittgenstein » (eds. Fabio Sulpizio, De Iaco, Schimmenti), Peter Lang, Actes du colloque tenu à Lecce, Italie, 2019,
Publication d’un article en français, « Faire nôtres les gestes de l’oeuvre, au delà du parallélisme analytique entre musique et langage »
RIFL, volume 14, number 1, 2020, numéro consacré à « Music and Language Revisited » (eds. C. Stover, S. Oliva)
Conférence prononcée à Lecce, Italie, dans un colloque sur Wittgenstein et Marx, paru dans « Wittgenstein and Marx. Marx and Wittgenstein » (eds. Sulpizio, De Iaco, Schimmenti), Peter Lang publ. , 2020.
Abstract : “When words are not just, then the works of art are excluded, and then if works are ruled out, then morals and art are ill. Which means that “justice is not rightly applied and the nation does not know where to stand up safe” (K. Kraus).
Not only Wittgenstein has his own view on fetichization (of “objects”) as regards the relation of designation of objects (as ontologically given) by names and developed an interesting critique of the “epistemological ritual” of naming « objects » that has a strong political dimension (Aldo Gargani’s point) but there is much to say as regards the benefit of a Marxist reading in parallel to a linguistic approach to objects. The role of the economist Sraffa’s conception (close to Gramsci) and his influence on Wittgenstein’s radical turn to his so-called “second philosophy” are to be mentioned in so far as they contribute to shed light on the social-political importance of the concept of “praxis” in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Yet far from me the idea that language and politics match. The point is rather to establish criterions of efficiency different in kind rather than intrinsically opposed.There are indeed good reasons for comparing the two critical diagnosis of semantic reification with social reification, given the existence of (austro) marxism in the social-political context of “Vienna the red” in the 1920’s as well as in the Marxist environment Wittgenstein was acquainted with in the 1935’s in Cambridge. Yet there is more to say in order to justify the use by Wittgenstein of the concept of “praxis”. Does “Praxis” as a key-word in Wittgenstein’s conception of “philosophy as an activity” in his second philosophy of “forms of life” contain a programme of application of symbols in life that really witnesses the search for a socio-political efficacy beyond a linguistic kind of praxis ? »
Diagrammatiser le « mouvement de pensée » (Denkbewegung) chez Wittgenstein, à partir d’une lecture de Aldo Giorgio Gargani, dans un séminaire sur le diagramme à l’EHESS, 105 Bd Raspail, 75006, organisé par Carlos LOBO, Franck JEDRZEJEWSKI Franck – INSTN.
Title: WITTGENSTEIN VERSUS THE PLATONISM OF SIGNIFICANCE: THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TURNING POINT TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF PRAXIS
Abstract: This paper is intended to elicit Wittgenstein’s position regarding platonism reformulated into 1 – the analytical investigation of the conditions for a meaningful language, and 2 the deepening of a problem generated by the illusory conception that it is possible to capture the ultimate atomic elements of the meaning of a linguistic complex. That’s the way one can indeed understand that Wittgenstein has presented a critique of the tradition of ontology. The fact that he endorsed a « quasi-realism » approach to « objects » (Br. McGuinness) contrasts with the future Vienna Circle at a time the latter was still under the spell of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, close to a Russellian kind of logical atomism. It is not surprising that later on, Wittgenstein’s own « platonism » in its Fregean version became a target in the anthropological framework of a broader self-criticism for the belief in referential entities, or « objectual fetichism » (in A. Gargani’s terms). This anthropological turn nonetheless did not conquer the harder epistemological public of readers looking for logical truth. Yet, it presents some interesting features articulated to a « philosophy of praxis » that make « forms of life » the core of a possible critical grammar adjusted to a political engagement. Such an articulation that has been so much put into question among a number of theoreticians of social theory in Frankfurt and even later in France (e.g. Alain Badiou’s critique of Wittgenstein), seems to be on the contrary the opening of a new and fruitful way to consider contradictions between Frankfurt and Vienna in connection with social praxis.